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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The Plaintiffs are incorrect in their assertion that 
"there is no evidence establishing, or even suggesting, that 
Dee's motive in making the statement to Mr. Geiger was to force 
Mr. Taylor to buy out the Christiansens' interest in BWC" 
I 
(Respondent's Brief, at 5). The trial transcript includes 
Taylor's testimony that the discussions with the Christiansens 
regarding sale of BWC to Taylor and Westman came only two or 
three months after the Geiger incident. (Tr. 84-85; R. 470-471.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bullington v. Mize, relied upon by the Plaintiffs, does 
not eliminate the necessity of foreclosure prior to the present 
suit for deficiency, because (1) the parties to this action 
selected Utah law to govern their rights and obligations, whereas 
1 
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the parties in Bullington did not, and (2) in the present action 
Utah has the greatest interest in applying its own law, whereas 
in Bullington, Utah's interest was nearly nonexistent. If 
Bullington has any bearing on this action, it is to require a 
prior foreclosure, since in Bullington a prior foreclosure had 
already occurred. 
The test of "impropriety" to be applied to actions for 
tortious interference with an existing contract should not be 
different than the test already stated by this Court with respect 
to interference with prospective economic relations. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT'S HOLDING IN BULLINGTON V. MIZE REQUIRES 
RATHER THAN PRECLUDES A PRIOR FORECLOSURE. 
The Plaintiffs rely primarily on Bullington v. Mize, 25 
Utah 2d 173, 478 P.2d 500 (1970), a 3-2 decision in which Texas 
law was applied to an action for deficiency after a trust deed 
foreclosure and sale in Texas. 
The issue in this case is different from that in 
Bullington. That case concerned Utah's willingness to second-
guess the adequacy of the steps taken in a foreclosure proceeding 
in another state, which Utah (by a narrow majority) refused to 
do. The present action concerns the plaintiffs' unilateral 
decision to dispense with the out-of-state action entirely, even 
though Utah law requires it as a first step. In Bullington, out-
of-state foreclosure had already occurred. Such previous out-of-
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state foreclosure is exactly what is being contended for by 
Taylor in this appeal. In effect, the plaintiffs turn the 
holding in Bullington inside out, arguing paradoxically that 
since an out-of-state foreclosure is binding, no out-of-state 
foreclosure is necessary. 
The court in Bullington clearly pointed out: 
A review of the significant contacts in 
this action reveals that the situs of the 
property conveyed by the trust deed, the 
performance of the obligation of the note, 
and the residency of the plaintiffs were in 
Texas... Defendant executed the note and 
trust deed in Colorado, and the property he 
traded as part of the transaction was located 
there. 
Id. at 502. Utah's only connection with the facts in Bullington 
was that it was arguably the residence of the defendant, although 
even that fact was disputed. W.. at 502. 
In the present action, by contrast, all significant 
contacts are with the state of Utah except the situs of the 
property. Utah was the residence of the plaintiffs and the 
defendants both at the time of contracting and at the time this 
action was filed (R. 2, 14), Utah was the state of negotiation 
and execution of the contract (R. 76, 251), Utah was the state of 
performance of the contract (R. 11), Utah was the state listed in 
the contract as the place of the contract (R. 9), and, above all, 
Utah was the state whose law was specifically selected, in the 
contract, by the parties (R. 14). 
The distinctions between Bullington and the present 
action may be summarized as follows: 
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Utah contacts 
Defendant's residence 
in Utah 
Plaintiff's residence 
in Utah 
Contract negotiated 
in Utah 
Contract executed 
in Utah 
Contract to be performed 
in Utah 
Utah law selected 
by parties 
Real property located 
in Utah 
Bullington 
v. Mize 
(?) 
Present 
Action 
-X-
-X-
-X-
-X-
-X-
-X-
The Court in Bullington quoted the following with 
approval: 
If the right to recover a deficiency is 
not prohibited by the law of the situs of the 
mortgaged property and the situs of the 
contract of mortgage indebtedness, the state 
of the forum has no interest in denying such 
right to deficiency allowed by the law of the 
situs, and will, generally speaking, give 
effect to that right... [citing 136 A.L.R. 
1057, 1059, Anno. — Conflict of Laws— 
Deficiency Judgment Acts, Sec. 3]. 
Id. at 502-503, emphasis added. As the quoted provision 
demonstrates, the holding in Bullington was based on Utah's lack 
of interest in the outcome in that case, which rationale does not 
here apply. In the present action, the right to recover a 
deficiency is in fact "prohibited by the law of ... the situs of 
the contract of mortgage indebtedness," namely Utah. Utah has a 
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clear interest in regulating the contractual rights and duties 
existing between its residents. 
Most importantly, the parties, in the contract on which 
this action is based, explicitly selected Utah law to govern 
"[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties" (R. 14). The 
plaintiffs attempt to avoid the terms of their own contract by 
arguing that the subsequent Assignment, pursuant to which the 
deed of trust was executed, stated that "[t]his Assignment ... is 
not intended in any way to prejudice or waive the Christiansens1 
rights under either the Agreement, the Promissory Notes, or the 
lawsuit ..." (R. 126). The plaintiffs1 argument overlooks the 
fact that the original (BWC Purchase) Agreement, executed in 
conjunction with the Promissory Notes on which this action was 
based, provided that "[a]11 rights and obligations of the parties 
shall be governed, construed and enforced according to the laws 
and decisions of the State of Utah." (R. 14, emphasis added.) 
The provision was not limited to rights and obligations "under 
this contract only", nor did it provide a date in the future when 
the choice of Utah law was to automatically expire. The 
Promissory Notes which formed the basis for the judgment in this 
action were executed on the same date as the Agreement selecting 
Utah law. (R. 9-22.) Although the Assignment disclaimed any 
waiver of the plaintiffs' existing rights, it did not contain any 
provision by which the defendants, Taylor or Westman, purported 
to waive any of their rights or defenses. The trial court 
specifically ruled that the Assignment was supplemental to, and 
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did not replace# the parties1 previous Agreement. (Tr. 153-154; 
R. 539-540.) Therefore, the Assignment is to be read in light of 
the previous Agreement, in which Utah law was specifically 
selected. 
The plaintiffs also attempt to avoid the terms of their 
own contract by arguing that "the choice-of-law question ... is 
not presented" (Respondent's Brief, at 8), and attempting to 
define the issue here as something else. The plaintiffs contend 
that Utah law incorporates, makes way for, or is the same as, 
Colorado law, and therefore application of Colorado law is really 
the application of Utah law. The plaintiffs' argument flies in 
the face of the majority's statement in Bullington, supra, 
itself: 
[T]he issue to be resolved in this appeal is 
a choice-of-law question. 
Id. at 502. The choice in Bullington was between Utah law and 
Texas law; and the choice was made by the Court since it had not 
been made by the parties. In the present action the choice is 
between Utah law and Colorado law; and the parties have selected 
Utah law in their Agreement. 
Comment h on Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws (1971), allowing parties to make their own 
choice of law by contract, states: 
The reference, in the absence of a contrary 
indication of intention, is to the "local 
law" of the chosen state and not to that 
state's "law", which means the totality of 
its law including its choice of law rules. 
Section 4(1) of the Restatement (Second) provides in part: 
6 
[T]he "local law" of a state is ... exclusive 
of its rules of Conflict of Laws ... 
Thus the parties' choice of Utah law to govern all of their 
rights and obligations should not be read as a backhanded choice 
of Colorado law. 
Taylor respectfully submits that Bullington should be 
either limited to its facts# or carried to its logical 
conclusion. Since the court in Bullington saw fit to respect the 
validity of a prior Texas foreclosure, and since Utah law, 
voluntarily selected by the parties, requires prior foreclosure, 
a valid Colorado foreclosure should first occur before 
commencement of an action in Utah. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT'S TEST FOR "IMPROPRIETY" WAS MET 
IN THE TRIAL OF THIS ACTION. 
The issue in this case is whether the test of 
"impropriety of means", as stated recently by this Court in Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Company v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), 
is to be applied any differently where the defendant induces a 
breach of contract by a third party than it is where the 
defendant breaches or interferes with performance of his own 
contract. 
The plaintiffs cite Soter v. Wasatch Development Corp., 
21 Utah 2d 224, 443 P.2d 663 (Utah 1968). However, Soter differs 
from the present action in that in Soter, documents showed the 
plaintiff's previous ratification and support of the negotiations 
between the defendant and a third party which the plaintiff later 
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claimed constituted "interference." In addition, the effect of 
such negotiations was to protect the defendant, and therefore 
protect the plaintiff, by reducing the defendant's damages 
resulting from a previous breach by the plaintiff. In the 
present action, by contrast, there was no previous breach or 
wrongful act by Taylor, no benefit to Taylor in having Geiger 
withdraw from his purchase, and no ratification by Taylor of Dee 
Christiansen's efforts to cause Geiger's withdrawal. 
The privilege argued for by the plaintiffs is not 
absolute. Although Taylor is aware of no Utah cases setting 
forth the extent of privilege for interference with existing 
contracts, Dee Christiansen's purpose — to preserve Geiger's 
money for investment in Dee Christiansen's other ventures, and to 
force Taylor to remain in BWC so that he could borrow money or 
buy out the Christiansens' interest — does not fall within any 
of the privileged purposes set forth in Sections 768 through 774 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979). Neither do such 
purposes fall within the First Amendment privilege for 
politically motivated conduct recognized by this Court in Searle 
v. Johnson, 709 P.2d 328 (Utah 1985). 
In arguing that the "improper purpose or means" 
required by this Court has not been shown, the plaintiffs cite 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, supra, a case involving 
interference with prospective economic relations. In Isom this 
Court said: 
Neither a deliberate breach of contract 
nor an immediate purpose to inflict injury 
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which does not predominate over a legitimate 
economic end will/ by itself/ satisfy this 
element of the tort [improper means]. 
However, they may do so in combination. This 
is so because contract damages provide an 
insufficient remedy for a breach prompted by 
an immediate purpose to injure, and that 
purpose does not enjoy the same legal 
immunity in the context of contract relations 
as it does in the competitive marketplace. 
Id. at 309/ emphasis added. 
In Isoitt/ recovery was allowed where the lessor's 
purpose was to ruin its lessee's business in order to reobtain 
possession of the lessor's building and sell it more profitably 
elsewhere. The Court cited Cherberg v. Peoples National Bank of 
Washington/ 88 Wash.2d 595/ 564 P.2d 1137 (1977)/ in which 
recovery was permitted where the defendant's purpose was to 
destroy the business of a lessee so that the defendant could 
retake the building/ demolish it# and erect a more profitable 
building, and Buxbom v. Smith/ 23 Cal.2d 535/ 145 P.2d 305 
(1944)/ in which recovery was permitted where the defendant's 
purpose was to facilitate its hiring of the plaintiff's 
employees. 
None of the foregoing cases involved any evidence of 
spite or personal ill-will toward the person whose economic 
relations were interfered with. In Cherbergt supra, the Court 
said: 
The distinguishing feature between the two 
lines of cases [those which do and those 
which do not allow recovery] would seem to be 
whether the interference with business 
relations was a mere incidental consequence 
of the breach ... 
9 
TA. at 1143. 
Thus the issue on this appeal is whether the foregoing 
test of "impropriety of means" is to be applied any differently 
where the defendant induces a breach of contract by a third party 
than it is where the defendant breaches his own contract. In 
other words, is Dee Christiansen's inducement of a breach by 
Geiger privileged or "proper" where, under the tests in Isom, 
Buxbom, and Cherberg, supra, breach by Dee Christiansen (had he 
contracted not to induce a breach by Geiger) would not have been 
proper. Taylor respectfully submits that there is no basis for 
distinguishing between the two situations, because in either case 
"contract damages provide an insufficient remedy", Isom, supra, 
at 309. Therefore, the undisputed evidence shows intentional 
interference with contract by Dee Christiansen. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Harold W. Taylor, respectfully seeks an 
Order of this Court reversing the judgment of the District Court 
in favor of the plaintiffs and an Order dismissing the 
plaintiffs1 claim until completion of trust deed sale or 
foreclosure. 
In addition, Taylor seeks reversal of the District 
Court's dismissal of his counterclaim. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I fTt£, daY o f June, 1987. 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
^ K E O T H ^ 
GORDON J.ySWENSON 
Attorneys' for Appellant 
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